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Abstract 
A great deal of research as been devoted to nontrivial reasoning in the presence of inconsis- 
tency. However, previous formalisms on this account do not permit consistent reasoning in the 
presence of inconsistency-they may conclude a statement on one hand and the negation of the 
statement on the other. In this paper, we propose a logic that allows an agent o reason consistently, 
even though there are inconsistencies in the agent’s beliefs. We first give the semantics of the 
logic and then present a simple, sound and complete axiomatization for the logic, thus forming 
the formal basis of reasoning consistently in the presence of inconsistency. 
Keywords: Logic of knowledge and belief; Knowledge representation; Reasoning with inconsistency; 
Knowledge base systems 
1. Introduction 
It has long been recognized that inconsistencies may easily arise in knowledge based 
information processing [ 3,5]. This may be due to some conflicting rules or data being 
recorded in the knowledge base system. Removing inconsistencies from a knowledge 
base is difficult and expensive since, as we know, inconsistencies may not lie on the 
surface and in most cases there is no single solution to eliminate them. Furthermore, 
before a knowledge base is even discovered to be inconsistent, the users might have 
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been using it for quite some time [ 2 1. Thus, as pointed out by Halpern [ 1 I 1, reasoning 
in the presence of inconsistency is an issue which will need to be considered in the 
design of knowledge bases. 
A great deal of research has been devoted to constructing systems that allow reasoning 
in the presence of inconsistency. Most of them are based on some kind of multi- 
valued logic (e.g., [ I, 3,5,6. 14,21.25,26]. to name just a few). These systems avoid 
falling into triviality (i.e., concluding every sentence in the underlying language) in 
the presence of inconsistency. However, they may generate inconsistent conclusions or 
conclusions that contradict their other conclusions. For example, given a knowledge 
base ICI = p A up A (4 A ( y > r), both p and up will be deduced by the aforementioned 
systems. 
In many cases, we would like to avoid inconsistent conclusions as well as triviality. 
That is, we want a system that allows “safe” conclusions-“safe” in the sense that the 
conclusions arc not contradictory. Such a system should satisfy the following condition 
(where t represents the deductive relation of the system, and consistency is with respect 
to classical logic) : 
(C) For any knowledge base represented by a formula $, {a / Cc, t- ay) is consistent. 
This condition distinguishes the system we will construct (in terms of a modal operator 
BC) in this paper from the above mentioned systems. 
For a system that satisfies (C), we say that the conclusions generated from the 
system are safe. We hereafter also call safe conclusions scfe beliefs or consistent beliefs. 
An example of safe (consistent) beliefs is q or LJ > r in the knowledge base $ = 
p A up A 9 A (4 > r), since intuitively y and r are not involved in the inconsistency. In 
contrast, both p and 71~ are “unsafe” and cannot be consistently believed for obvious 
reasons. 
We now speculate on some properties of safe beliefs. Firstly, from condition (C) it 
is clear that the set of safe beliefs should be consistent. Secondly, we want the system 
to have the ability to “reason” about safe beliefs. For example, in the aforementioned 
I+?, we want to be able to conclude r from the safe beliefs q and y > r, since normal 
reasoning about q and r should not be disrupted by the inconsistency in p. Thus, the 
set of safe beliefs should be closed under implication. Thirdly, we want the damage 
incurred by the presence of inconsistency to be minimized. Hence in some sense the 
set of safe beliefs should include as much as possible of the total set of beliefs. In 
particular, when there is no inconsistency in the knowledge base, the set of safe beliefs 
of the knowledge base should coincide with the set of (classic) logical consequences 
of the knowledge base. The main focus of this paper is a modal operator BE that allows 
reasoning about safe (consistent) beliefs. The operator satisfies the three properties we 
just described. This we will show in the paper. 
The need for reasoning about safe beliefs arises in applications such as a medical 
expert system where knowledge is often obtained from multiple physicians. It is common 
that the system is inconsistent since different physicians often disagree on diagnoses of 
patients’ diseases. Then the question is: given the conflict (inconsistency) in the expert 
system, can plausible diagnoses be made about a patient’s disease? Suppose the system 
has a knowledge base I,!I = 19 A lp A q A (q > r), where p means “the patient has 
J. Lin /Artificial Intelligence 86 (1996) 75-9.5 II 
hepatitis”. It is then clear that the diagnosis that the patient has hepatitis is a bad one 
since another piece of information in the knowledge base (-p) has already denied it. So 
is the diagnosis that the patient does not have hepatitis. Both could have a detrimental 
effect on the patient, i.e., the former results in the patient going through unnecessary 
treatment and the latter results in the treatment of the patient being delayed. Hence, 
diagnoses hould not be made on the basis of inconsistent (unsafe) beliefs. In contrast, 
suppose that it is r instead of p that means “the patient has hepatitis”, and q I r is a 
rule meaning “if a patient has jaundice then he/she has hepatitis”. Then we would not 
have a problem in believing that “the patient has hepatitis” according to the fact that 
he/she has jaundice. We therefore need reasoning about safe (consistent) beliefs for 
diagnoses in a medical expert system that is possibly inconsistent. 
For several modal logics of belief [6,7,15,19,27], the presence of an inconsistency 
is not as damaging as in classical ogics. Among them, Levesque’s logic of implicit and 
explicit belief [ 191 is the basis of our development here. However, these logics aim at 
a different problem (the problem of logical omniscience). An agent’s beliefs in these 
logics are generally not closed under implication and they are not suitable for reasoning 
about consistent beliefs. Our approach also differs from the approach which defines a 
sentence to be a consequence of an inconsistent knowledge base if the sentence is a 
logical consequence of every maximal consistent subset of the knowledge base. The 
latter is largely syntax oriented while the former has a semantics built on top of a 
three-valued logic. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the definition of sirua- 
tions and presents the basic part of the logic. Section 3 formally defines the semantics 
of belief and consistent belief. Section 4 explores the properties of belief and consistent 
belief operators, in particular, the modus ponens property by which the agent is allowed 
to reason with his consistent beliefs. Section 5 presents a sound and complete axiomati- 
zation for the logic. Sections 6 discusses ome examples of using the logic for reasoning 
about inconsistencies in a medical domain and reasoning about distributed knowledge 
of a group of agents. Finally, Section 7 suggests ome topics for future research. The 
proof of completeness of the logic is left in Appendix A. 
2. The basic part of the logic 
The formulas in the language we consider are formed from a set of atomic propositions 
(atoms for short) P using the three standard connectives -J, A and V as usual, and two 
modal operators Be and B. The operator B’ is to capture consistent beliefs and B to 
capture beliefs that include not only consistent beliefs but also possibly inconsistent 
ones. A formula such as BCV is read “the agent believes cr”, BCcv is read “the agent 
consistently believes 8. We consider only a single agent and formulas that do not have 
nested modal operators. We choose modal operators to represent beliefs so that we are 
able to express both the agent’s beliefs and facts in the real world. A description like 
{BP, q} means that the agent believes p, and q is true in the real world. Note that 
reasoning about the real world is different from reasoning about the beliefs of an agent, 
because what the agent thinks may not reflect what is happening in the real world. 
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Other connectives > and = are defined in terms of 7, A, and V; that is, LY 1 p is 
an abbreviation of la V p, and (Y E p is an abbreviation of (cy > /3) A (p 3 (Y). 
Following Levesque [ 201, we call formulas without any belief operator objective, and 
formulas where atoms all occur within the scope of a belief operator subjective. Since we 
consider only formulas that do not have nested belief operators, it should be understood 
that all formulas appearing within the scope of a belief operator are objective, throughout 
this paper. We take a knowledge base Cc, to be an objective formula. We usually use 
p, q, r, a, b, c to denote atoms, and 1 to denote a literal, which is either an atom or the 
negation of an atom. For convenience, we use the notation -1 for up if 1 is p, and for 
p if I is lp, where p is an atom. 
To interpret an inconsistent KB, we use a generalization of possible world, called 
situation. A situation is similar to a possible world, except that the former can support 
both p and up for some atom p. ’ If a situation supports both p and up for some p, 
we say that it is incoherent. 
Formally, a situation is a mapping: P + {{t}, {f}, {t, f}}. We call s(p) the set-up 
for atom p in situation s. We use O(s) to denote the set of atoms whose set-ups in s 
are {t,f}, i.e., O(s) = {p ) s(p) = {t,f}, p E P}. A possible world is a situation s 
such that O(s) is empty. We denote the set of all situations by S, and the set of all 
possible worlds by W. We say that a situation s is more complete than s’ (denoted by 
s cc s’) if O(s) c O( s’). Clearly, cc gives a partial order over the situations in S. 
A belief model M is a nonempty subset of S such that there is a situation in M that 
is minimal with respect to <c.2 Intuitively, M is the set of situations that the agent 
believes possible. 
We now define the support relations /=r and /==F. As in [ 191, M, s kT a means “the 
situation s in the belief model M supports the truth of (Y” and M, s f==F a means “the 
situation s in M supports the falsity of (Y”. 
( 1) M, s f==T p, where p is an atom, iff t E s(p). 
M, s bF p, where p is an atom, iff f E s(p). 
(2) M,s/===,(crAp) iffM,s/=rCuandM,sbr/?. 
M,s~F(~~~p)iffM,s~=I;cuorM,s~;I,p. 
(3) M,s~=,(LYV,B) iffM,sb=,aorM,sbr/3. 
M,s/=,(LYV/?) iffM,sk=,aandM,skF/3. 
(4) M, s kT TX iff M, s kF a. 
M,~/=~~~iffM,s~r~. 
A situation supports the truth of a set of formulas if and only if it supports the truth of 
every formula in the set, and supports the falsity of the set if and only if it supports the 
falsity of at least one formula in the set. 
’ Our notion of situation is somewhat different from that of [ I9 I, where Levesque also considers situations 
that support neither p nor up for some atom p. 
‘A situation s is minimal in M with respect to <C if s E M and there is no ?;’ E M such that s’ <C S. The 
requirement that the belief model M has a minimal element with respect to <( is made for technical reasons: 
In the semantics of B and BC defined later we do not want MC(M), the set of most-complete situations of 
M, to be empty. The requirement is always satisfied if the set of primitive propositions is finite. 
J. Lin /Artificial Intelligence 86 (1996) 75-95 79 
In what follows, for an objective formula (Y, we use the notation [a] to denote the 
set of situations in S that support he truth of cy. When there is no risk of confusion, 
we simply use “support LY” for “support he truth of cy”. 
3. The semantics of BC and B 
Returning to the example $ = p A yp A q A (q 3 I), firstly, we would like to obtain 
BCq and Bc(q > r), since intuitively q and r have nothing to do with the inconsistency 
in Cc,. Secondly, we want to obtain BCr (from Bcq and BC( q > I) ) since it is desirable 
to draw conclusions from consistent beliefs. Thirdly, as any consistent belief should also 
be a belief, we want to obtain Bq, B(q 3 r) and Br as well. 
However, consider the situations that support cc/: 
Sl CL A iI 
s2 WI w WI 
s3 WI W) 01 
s4 ttv.0 {tvf) w 
S5 WI WI hf) 
There is a situation, namely ~4, that supports + but does not support r. On closer 
examination of ~4, we observe that not only does p receive the inconsistent set-up 
{r, f} (which is justified since both p and lp are in #), but also q receives {t, f}. 
On the other hand, in st (which supports r), only p receives {t, f}. In fact in st fewer 
atoms receive {t, f} than in any other situation, and therefore st is the situation among 
the five that is “closest” to a possible world in which no atom receives {t, f}. This 
suggests that we restrict our attention to situations that are “closest” to possible worlds, 
which we refer to as most-complete situations. 
Formally, for S 2 S, define the set of most-complete situations in S to be MC(S) = 
{s 1 s E S, $s’ E S such that s’ cc s}. 
Proposition 1. Zf LY is an objective formula and is consistent, then MC( [a]) is the set 
of possible worlds that satisfy a. 
Proof. Follows from the fact that a possible world is a situation s such that O(s) is 
empty. 0 
We are now in a position to define the semantics of B. We may want to define, 
similarly to the ordinary possible world semantics, that the agent believes a formula (Y 
if every situation in his belief model M supports (Y. However, this definition does not 
bring us desirable results. Under this definition, given the knowledge base I++ mentioned 
above (the agent’s belief model M is then the set of situations t-sg as illustrated), 
the agent does not believe r because the situation s4 in M does not support r. But as 
mentioned, it is desirable to have Br from the knowledge base +, since we want to have 
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Bcr and would like our agent to believe a formula if he already consistently believes 
the formula. 
We therefore restrict our attention to most-complete situations in M and say that the 
agent believes a formula if every most-complete situation in his belief model M supports 
the formula. 
(5) M,s /==r BCX iff for all s’ E MC(M), M.s' f=r a.j 
M, s bF Ba iff M, s & Ba. 
Let us now focus on designing a semantics for BE. It is tempting to define BE in terms 
of B, e.g., define M, s b=T BCa iff M, s kr Ba and M, s & Bxx. However, we will 
show shortly that this definition does not give us desirable results. To see the motivation 
of our semantics for Be, let us reconsider the example $ = p A lp A qA (q > r). Notice 
that every situation in MC( [$l] ) supports the truth but not the falsity of q. This is also 
the case for q > r and r, but not for p of which both truth and falsity are supported. By 
our earlier discussion, q and q > r (as well as r) should be obtained as consistent beliefs 
while p and up should not. We therefore say that the agent consistently believes a if 
each most-complete situation in his belief model coherently supports a, i.e., supports 
the truth but not the falsity of LY. 
(6) M, s IT BCu iff for all s’ t MC(M), M, s' /=r a and M, s' pF a. 
M,s kF BCa iff M,s kT BCcx. 
Note that it is not the case that if M, s /==T Bcu and M, s pT Bla then M, s /==T BCa. 
To see this, consider a knowledge base Cc, = p A ( up V lq) A q and M = [[qb]. It can be 
verified that M, s bT Bp and M, s kT B7p, but M, s & BCp. Intuitively, both p and q 
equally contribute to the inconsistency of $; to be conservative, neither p nor q should be 
consistently believed. Indeed, by our semantics neither p nor q is consistently believed. 
This also tells us that defining BC in terms of B via M, s bT BCcv iff M, s /=T Bcr 
and M, s pT BTCY, is too strong. Using that definition, we can conclude that the agent 
consistently believes both p and q. But the agent also believes up V Tq, which is the 
negation of p A q! We certainly do not want the agent to consistently believe a formula 
if he believes its negation. 
Finally, we say LY is valid (denoted k cu) if M, s br a for all belief models M and 
s E W. If (Y is objective, we may abbreviate M, s k=T LY by s bT (Y since M is not 
relevant. If cy is subjective, we may write M k=T LY for M, s &. a since s is not relevant. 
4. Properties of BE and B 
First of all, it is easy to see that an objective formula is valid if and only if it is a 
tautology; hence the propositional subset of the language is correctly handled. 
3 We may think equivalently in terms of accessibility relations. For the accessibility relations corresponding 
to B and Be, the set of situations accessible from any situation is MC(M). This is similar to logics such as 
SS where in the single-agent case we can assume that the same set of worlds is accessible from each world 
1121. 
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For consistent beliefs, we have the following axioms: 
~B’(TY) where (Y is a tautology. (Al) 
BCaABc~~Bc(a~~). (AZ) 
B’CV A Bc( a > ,O) > BC/?. (A3) 
The first axiom demonstrates that the agent cannot consistently believe any inconsistent 
formula (or falsehood). In other words, any consistent belief is consistent. The second 
axiom shows that consistently believing a conjunction is equivalent to consistently be- 
lieving each conjunct. From these two axioms it follows that the set of consistent beliefs 
of the agent is consistent. Thus, Be satisfies the first property for safe beliefs mentioned 
in the introduction section. The third axiom is the version of modus ponens for BC; it 
shows that the set of consistent beliefs is closed under implication. This axiom makes 
the inferences such as inferring Bcr from Bcq and BC( q > r) possible, so that the 
agent is able to draw conclusions from consistent beliefs. Therefore, BC has the second 
property for safe (consistent) beliefs we discussed in the introduction. Moreover, since 
in the semantics of Be most-complete situations are used, inconsistencies in the agent’s 
beliefs are minimized and so the set of consistent beliefs is maximized within the total 
set of beliefs. In particular, when there is no inconsistency in the agent’s knowledge 
base, by Proposition 1 the belief model of the agent is the set of possible worlds that 
satisfy the knowledge base. It is therefore easy to see that the set of consistent beliefs 
of the agent coincides with the set of (classic) logical consequences of the knowl- 
edge base. The operator Be has achieved all the desirable properties we outlined in the 
introduction. 
For the relationships between belief and consistent belief, we have: 
BCa > Ba. (A4) 
BCa > ~BTx. (A5) 
Axiom (A4) shows the intuition that beliefs include consistent beliefs. Axiom (A5) 
reflects the following fact: if the agent consistently believes a formula, then he must 
not believe the negation of the formula, for otherwise he believes both the formula and 
its negation, contradicting the assumption that he consistently believes the formula. For 
example, given the agent’s knowledge base + = p A up A q A (q > r), the agent does 
not consistently believe p (or -up> since he believes 7~ (or p, respectively). 
For belief, we have: 
Ba where (Y is a tautology. (A6) 
BaABP-B(aAp). (A7) 
Axiom (A6) implies that our agent is “perfect” in believing tautologies, as in classical 
logic. However, B is different from classical logic because the agent can have inconsistent 
beliefs without believing every formula. For example {Bp,B-p, TBq} is satisfiable. 
Axiom (A7) is the property of conjunctive beliefs. 
We have limited versions of modus ponens between BC and B: 
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BC~ A B(a > p) > BP. tA8) 
BLY A Bc(a > p) > B’P. (A9) 
Both axioms are rather intuitive. They say that whenever the antecedent of the implica- 
tion or the implication itself is consistently believed, a conclusion can be drawn through 
the implication. Indeed, in our daily life, if there is no controversy about a fact or a 
rule, we typically use it to make inferences. 
5. A complete axiomatization 
In this section we concentrate on obtaining a complete axiomatization for our logic. 
We presented some axioms for Be and B in the last section.4 We shall introduce 
additional axioms to complete the axiom system. 
The axiom system should include the axioms of the standard propositional logic: 
All instances of tautologies. 
And include a rule of inference from that logic: 
(AlO) 
From LY and cy > p, infer p (modus ponens) . (RI) 
In addition, we need axioms stating that Be and B respect the standard properties such 
as commutativity, associativity, distributivity, DeMorgan’s laws and double negation. For 
example, if ffV@ is consistently believed then so is ~VCY, and if a is consistently believed 
then so is TY(Y, etc. We summarize these properties by the following axiom called axiom 
(CNF) , where LYC.JF and (YDNF are the conjunctive normal form and disjunctive normal 
form of (Y respectively, and L stands for one of BE and B: 
LLY E LCWNF s LCQNF. (All) 
LCI > L( (Y V p) (axiom of subsumption). (A12) 
The following result gives soundness and completeness for the axiom system: 
Theorem 2. The system consisting of axioms (A 1) -( Al 2) and (RI ) is sound and 
complete for the above logic. 
Proof of soundness. We first present two lemmas that will be needed later. 
Lemma 3. For any situation s and any objective formula LY, either s /=r LY or s k=F cy 
holds. 
Proof. By a straightforward induction on the structure of a---the statement follows by 
assumption if LY is an atom, and is easily checked for negations and conjunctions. •! 
4 Note that some axioms are redundant, e.g., (A3) can be obtained from (A4) and (A9). and (Al) can be 
obtained from (A6) and (A5). 
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Lemma 4. Let s and s’ be two situations such that s(p) G s’(p) for all p E P. Then 
for any objective a, ifs b=r cy then s’ kT a. 
Proof. By induction on the structure of cu; the statement can be easily checked against 
the definition of the support relations. 0 
It is easy to see that axioms (A2), (A4), (A5), (A7) and (AlO)-(A12) are sound, 
and that (Rl ) preserves validity. 
(Al): Follows from axioms (A6) and (A5). 
(A3): Follows from (A4) and (A9). 
(A6) : Let M be a belief model and LY be a tautology. Consider s E MC(M) . Let w 
be a possible world such that for all p E P, w(p) = {t} if s(p) = {t,f}, and 
w(p) = s(p) otherwise. Then w(p) C s(p) for all p E P. In addition, we 
have w kr LY since (Y is a tautology. By Lemma 4, we have s +r LY. As s is 
any situation in MC(M), we have M +r Ba. 
(A8): Let M be a belief model such that M t=r B% A B(a > /3). Let s be any 
situation in MC(M). From M kT B’cu, we have s kr cr and s FF LY. Hence 
s pr W. From M kT B( cy > p) , we have s kT (Y > /3, i.e., s br T(Y V j3. 
Then since s i+r Y(Y it follows that s kr j?. Since s is any situation in 
MC(M), M kT BP. 
(A9) : Let M be a belief model such that M k’T Bcu A B’((Y > /3). Let s be any 
situation in MC(M). From M +r BLY, we have s kr (Y. From M kT B’(Q, > 
p), we have M k=T Bc( TY V p) and hence s pF -XV V /3. Then we have 
s kr (Y A +I. Since s /=r (Y, we have s pr $. That is, s FF /3. And by 
Lemma 3, we have s kr p. Since s is any situation in MC(M), M b=T BE@ 
The proof of completeness is more involved and is presented in Appendix A. 0 
6. Applications 
6.1. An example in medical diagnosis 
In this section we present an example of using the logic for reasoning in the presence 
of inconsistency in a medical domain. In the examples, we use formulas that describe 
both an agent’s beliefs and the true state of affairs in the real world. 
Suppose our agent is a medical doctor forming a diagnosis of a patient’s disease. Let 
si denote “the patient has symptom Si” and di denote “the patient has disease di”. In 
this domain we assume that there are five symptoms st -s5 and three diseases dl-d3 of 
primary concern. Suppose the doctor is capable of detecting the symptoms if the patient 
does have them, perhaps by examining the patient and/or running relevant laboratory 
tests on the patient. This can be expressed as: 
Si >BC(Si) for i= 1,...,5. (1) 
That is, if the patient does have the symptom Si (i.e., Si is indeed true) then the doctor 
will detect the symptom from the patient (i.e., the doctor will believe Si) . In particular, 
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not only the doctor will detect the symptom but also he will consistently detect the 
symptom, so that he will not detect (believe) both that the patient has the symptom and 
that the patient does not have the symptom. In other words, will the doctor not only 
believe s; but also consistently believe s;. 
The doctor has knowledge about the symptoms as follows: 
B(sl A s2 > d, ). (2) 
B(.q > d,). (3) 
B(.s? A sJ > +). (4) 
B(s5 1 d?). (5) 
The first and second formulas mean that (the doctor believes) symptom SI together with 
s2 presents disease dr , and that dl is never associated with symptom sg. The third and 
fourth say that (the doctor believes) symptom s3 together with s4 excludes disease d2, 
and that sg presents disease d3. Suppose now the patient has all of the five symptoms: 
S) AS~AS3AS4ASSg. (6) 
Let I‘ be the set consisting of the formulas ( l)-(6). Let k mean provability in our 
logic. Then we have the following results: 
. f t Bd, A BTd, A B-d2 A Bd3. 
l r k TBcd, A TBcTd,. 
l f k lBCd2. 
Proof. For the first statement, we prove I’ t Bdt . The proof of r E Bldt A Bld2 A Bds 
can be carried out similarly. The steps of proving I‘ t Bdt are as follows: 
I. .stA.q from (6) in f’. 
2. s, > BC(s,) ( 1) in I’. 
3. BCs, A B’s2 I. 2; modus ponens. 
4. B’(s, A .s?) 3; conjunctive beliefs (A2). 
5. B(st A s2 1 dl) (2) in I’. 
6. Bd, 4, 5; axiom (A8). 
The second and the third are proved using the result obtained from the first statement 
and axiom (A5). Cl 
Thus, reasoning about the agent’s beliefs and reasoning about the true state of affairs 
in the real world can be carried out in our logic at the same time. While facts in the real 
world are consistent (e.g., the set r is consistent), an agent’s beliefs can be inconsistent. 
But the inconsistency of the agent’s beliefs does not warrant arbitrary conclusions (such 
as concluding s6 or Bdd); inconsistency is dealt with by the B operator. The derivation 
of TB’dl and TBCd2 (from I‘) is due to the derivation of BTdt and BTd2. That is, 
the doctor does not consistently believe dl or d2, since he believes -dl and Td2. If the 
doctor makes a diagnosis based on consistent beliefs, then he does not diagnose that 
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the patient has disease dl or d:! (nor does he diagnose that the patient has not dl, since 
lB%dt is also derivable from r). 
Suppose further that in this particular domain, the doctor believes (for sure) that one 
of the three diseases is possible. This is expressed as: 
B’(di V d2 Vd3). (7) 
Let r be the set consisting of the formulas (l)-(7). We have the following result: 
l rFBBed3. 
Proof. The steps of the proof are as follows: 
1. r assumption. 
2. Bldt A BTd2 1; last lemma. 
3. B(ld, A --d2) 2; conjunctive beliefs. 
4. Bc(d, V d2 V dj) (7) in r. 
5. Bc( Td, A Td2 II d3) 4; definition of 3, DeMorgan’s rule. 
6. BC(d3) 3, 5; axiom (A9). 0 
Therefore, d3 is consistently believed. This relies on the fact that one of the three 
diseases can be consistently believed, and that dl and d2 cannot be consistently believed 
(since ldl and ld2 are believed). Thus the doctor diagnoses that the patient has disease 
d3, on the basis of his consistent belief about d3. 
6.2. Reasoning 5out distributed knowledge in a group of agents 
In this section, we discuss the application of Be and B in reasoning about distributed 
knowledge in a group of agents. 
Halpern and Moses [ 121 shows that it is desirable to be able to reason about knowl- 
edge that is implicit in a group of agents, which they call distributed knowledge. For 
example, if one agent knows a and another agent knows a > b, then combining their 
knowledge yields 6, even though it might be the case that neither of the agents in- 
dividually knows b. If there is no contradiction among the agents’ knowledge bases, 
distributed knowledge can be easily obtained as the logical consequences of the union 
of the knowledge bases. However, different agents can, and often do, hold conflicting 
views on their domain of expertise. In that case, using classical ogic every formula in 
the language is a consequence of the union of all the agents’ knowledge. It is therefore 
necessary to define a new semantics for distributed knowledge when there are conflicts 
among the agents. 
With Be or B, we can give such a semantics. Let +, , . . . , t,b,, be the knowledge bases 
of the agents. Then the first semantics for distributed knowledge is: 
Definition 5. CY is distributed knowledge of the agents $1, . . . , @, iff 
Ill//, A... A &,I FT BCcr. 
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This definition has the following nice properties: ( 1) the set of distributed knowledge 
is consistent; (2) if $, A A 9, is consistent, then LY is distributed knowledge if and 
only if (Y is a classical logic consequence of *, A . A *,. 
Example6. Suppose@,=uAb,q5,=-nA(b>c),and+3=c3d,thenb,c,dare 
all distributed knowledge of the three agents, while a and ~a are not. 
If we do not require the set of distributed knowledge to be consistent, we can use B 
for the semantics of distributed knowledge: 
Definition 7. (Y is distributed knowledge of the agents @i , , $,, if1 
This definition has the second property of the last definition, but not the first one. 
Example 8. Suppose that the three knowledge bases are as in the last example. Then 
a, ~a, b, c, d are all distributed knowledge of the three agents. So the set of distributed 
knowledge of the agents under this definition may be inconsistent. 
Several other methods of merging the knowledge of multiple agents are discussed in 
1241. 
7. Conclusion 
The phenomenon of inconsistent beliefs seems to occur even in science. As cited in 
[6], the physicist Eugene Wigner noted that the two great theories physicists reason 
with are the theory of quantum phenomena and the theory of relativity. However, Wigner 
thought that the two theories might well be incompatible! The incompatibility should 
not prevent us from reasoning about other facts irrelevant to the theory of quantum 
phenomena and relativity, e.g., inferring that Sam is not immortal from the fact that 
he is a man. We have proposed a formal semantics for reasoning consistently in the 
presence of inconsistency in terms of two belief operators BC and B. The operator BC 
allows the agent to reason with his consistent beliefs, and the operator B allows him 
to reason with both his consistent and inconsistent beliefs. The effect of inconsistency 
is localized in the sense that conclusions can still be drawn through implication from 
consistent beliefs. 
One future research direction is to generalize the logic to the first-order case and/or 
multiple agents case. In addition, it is interesting to extend the language to include 
meta-beliefs, and investigate the usefulness of the logic in other areas such as belief 
revision, counterfactuals, etc. The complexity of the logic should also be examined. 
This perhaps can be carried out in the same way as [ 7,16,19] where complexity of 
nonclassical logics is studied. 
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Appendix A. Proof of completeness 
First, we give some definitions and notation. For a set of formulas, we use A (or V) 
before the set to denote the conjunction (or disjunction, respectively) over the formulas 
in the set. The notion of theorem is defined as usual; that is, LY is a theorem iff it is 
provable from an empty set (denoted by k a). We write _X 1 cr if there is a finite subset 
2’ of 2 such that t A 2’ > (Y. For two formulas Q and p, we also use cr k p as a 
convenient abbreviation for k a > p. A formula (Y is inconsistent if -YX is a theorem, 
and consistent otherwise. A set of formulas 2 is inconsistent if it contains a finite subset 
2 such that r\ z(’ is inconsistent. 
For any objective (Y, we will omit the connectives V and A in its conjunctive normal 
form Q~F and disjunctive normal form (YDNF, and treat CYCNF to be a set of clauses (a 
clause is a set of literals where V is implied), and CYDNF as a set of dual clauses (a 
dual clause is a set of literals where A is implied). 
A set of formulas S is called downward saturated (or a Hintikka set) if it satisfies 
the following conditions: 
l For any (Y that is an atom in P or a formula of the form By or B’y, not both LY E S 
and -KY E S. 
l If --cu E S then (Y E S. 
l If (Y A p E S then LY E S and /l E S. 
l If (Y V p E S then LY E S or /3 E S. 
l If -(a A p) E S then la E S or -p E S. 
l IfT(aV/I) ESthenlaESand+ES. 
See, for example, [9,18] for more details of Hintikka set and its properties. 
We shall prove some preparatory lemmas in Part 1 and then prove the main theorem 
in Part 2. 
A.1. Part 1 
Lemma A.l. Let L denote one of B and BC. Then k L( (CT A p) V 7) E L( ( CY V y) A 
WVY)). 
Proof. Follows easily from the distribution axiom and the commutativity axiom (which 
are axioms in CNF). 0 
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Lemma A.2. Let L denote one of B and Be. Then L( ( (Y A p) V y) t L( cr V y) and 
L((aAP) VY) kL(PVy). 
Proof. By Lemma A.l, k L((~yr\p) Vy) =: L((aVy) A (/Ivy)). By the axiom of 
conjunctive beliefs ((A2) or (A7)), F L(((~vy) A (/?Vr)) E L(aVy) AL(pVr), 
from which the lemma follows. 0 
Lemma A.3. Let L denote one of B and BC, and let (Y be an (objective) formula of 
the ,form 
(aI r\Pl) v ((Y?AP?) v...v (ff,, Afin). 
Then La k L(cx~ V q V V LY,,). 
Proof. The proof proceeds by repeatedly invoking Lemma A.2 and the commutativity 
axiom (one of the axioms in CNF). 
I. Lir assumption. 
2. L(culV(LL2/\P2)V..,V((Y,APn)) I; Lemma A.2. 
3. U(a2A/32) V~~~V(GAPn) VW) 2; commutativity. 
4. L(cu~V---V(a,Ap,,) Vru{) 3; Lemma A.2. 
5. Lf (cr3 A j33) V . V (Ly, A &) V Ly1 V ff2) 4; commutativity. 
6. . . 
7. L(q v(Y2v...v(Y,i). 17 
Lemma A.4 Let L denote one of B and Be, and let LY be an (objective) formula of 
the ,form 
Then La k L((Y, V (~2 V . V a,, V y). 
Proof. Similar to Lemma A.3. 0 
Lemma AS. Let L denote one of B and Be. Let each of DI , , D, be a dual clause 
(a conjunction of literals) and C be a clause (a disjunction of literals). If each of 
D1,. , D, contains a literal of C, then k L( D1 V V D,) > LC. 
Proof. Let li be the literal of C contained in D,, i = 1,. . , n respectively. By Lemma 
A.3,1 L(DlV...VD,) > L(llV...Vl,). Since (11,. . .,I,} C: C, 1 L(llV...Vl,) II LC 
by the axiom of subsumption. It follows that E L( D1 V . . V D,) > LC. 0 
Lemma A.6. If [p] C [IV] then k Bp > Bv. 
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Proof. From [[PI G [[ y we have [PDNF] C [JTNFJJ. Let pDNF={&9-.-,&}- I) 
For every C E VaF that is not a tautology, we prove that for all i E [ 1, n], Di 
contains at least one literal of C. Suppose that some Di contains no literal of C. Notice 
that since C is not a tautology, C does not contain both p and up, for any p E P. Let 
s be the situation such that for p E P, 
if up E C, 
ifp E C, 
otherwise. 
Then s & C. It follows that s kr YCNF. But s br Di since Di contains no literal of C. 
Therefore s br. p,o~r, contradicting the assumption that [/.~r.~rl c [VW]. 
Hence each Di (i E [ 1, n] ) contains at least a literal of C. Then by Lemma A.5, we 
have B~DNF k BC. Similarly we can prove B/QNF I- BC’, for any other C’ E Y~F that 
is not a tautology. For any C’ E YaF that is a tautology, k BC’ by axiom (A6). Then 
using the axiom of conjunctive beliefs, we have B,UDNF I- Bv~F. By axiom (CNF) , we 
have k BP > Bv. 0 
LemmaA.7. kB(aV/3)ABC(wVy) >B(PVy). 
Proof. The steps of the proof are as follows: 
1. B(a V P> assumption. 
2. B(-~vyvP) (A6). 
3. B((@vP) A (-rvrvP>> 1, 2; conjunctive beliefs. 
4. W(aVP) A ((1rvr> VP)) 3. 
5. B((aA (-rvy)) VP) 4; Lemma A.l. 
6. B((~AT)V(QAY)‘JP) 5; distribution. 
7. B((-~,vy) 3 ((DAY) VP>> 6; definition of >, DeMorgan’s rule. 
8. BC( ~a v y) assumption. 
9. B((aAy) VP) 7, 8; (A8). 
10. B((aVp) A (rvp)) 9; Lemma A.l. 
11. B(Y V P) 10; conjunctive beliefs. 
12. B(P v Y) 11; commutativity. q 
Lemma A.& I- BC( (a A TLY A p) V y) E BCy. 
Proof. By the axiom of subsumption, k Bcy 1 BC( ( (Y A YY A /3) V y). 
WenowprovekBc((cu~lcu~p)~y) >Bey. 
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1. BC((aAwA/3) Vy) assumption. 
2. Bc(((a~l~) Vy) A (/?Vy)) 1; Lemma A.1. 
3. B’((~A w) Vy) 2; conjunctive beliefs (A2). 
4. BC( (la v a) > y) 3; definition of >, DeMorgan’s rule. 
5. B(w~LY) (A6). 
6. BCy 4. 5; (A9). 
Hence FBc((~/,l~~/3p) Vy) =B’y. 0 
A.2. Part 2 
Theorem A.9. The system consisting of axioms ( A 1) -( A 12) and (R 1) is complete for 
the above logic. 
Proof. To prove completeness, we must prove that every valid formula is provable. 
Equivalently, we prove every consistent formula is satisfiable. The proof is much like 
the one in [ 191. Given a consistent formula CT, we extend {g} into a consistent set X 
that is downward saturated (by adding necessary formulas into the set, e.g., if Q A /3 
is in the set, then add both (Y and p). Then Z contains a set of literals, conjunctions, 
disjunctions and the like, together with a finite set r of the form: 
{By;} u {-BS;} u {B’p;} u {~B’c$;} 
By propositional completeness we can find a possible world s that satisfies the set 
of literals in ,‘. Suppose we can prove that r is satisfiable, i.e., we can find a set of 
situations M that supports r, then M, s k’T 2 by the inductive definition of support. 
Since LT E 2, it follows that M, s &. (T. This means c is satisfiable. So every consistent 
formula is satisfiable. In that case we can conclude that our axiom system is complete. 
We now prove that r is satisfiable, i.e., we prove that there exists a set of situations 
M which supports r. We need the following lemma: 
Lemma A.lO. 
(a) For every formula & such that 7B6, E rl there exists a situation s such that 
+=,A?% s& -(AR) and s k$- 6. 
(b) For every formula 4; such that 7Bc$; E I., there exists a situation s such that 
s & An, s p.7. -(//pi) and s & 3;. 
Proof. By the axioms of conjunctive beliefs, we have r t B(l”\yi) and r 1 B’(A\pi). 
Let p = A yi and Y = A pi. Then r F Bp A BCv. In the following we would free the 
index i for other uses. 
We first prove there is a situation s such that s +r p and s pr 1~. Suppose not. Then 
[[PI C [YV~. By Lemma A.6, BP > Blv is a theorem. Since Bv > ~B’v is a theorem 
by axiom (A5), we have By 3 7Bcv is also a theorem. But since r F B,u A B’v, this 
means r (and therefore z() is inconsistent, a contradiction. Hence there is at least one 
situation s such that s /=r p and s Fr 7~. 
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Let ~DNF = Dt V**.v D, and VDNF =Ql v..*VQ,,,. In particular, let Qt,...,Qk 
(k < m) be the clauses in VDNF that do not contain both p and -p for any p E P. 
Note that k 2 1. Otherwise all of Qt, . . . , Q,,, contain both p and -p for some p E P, 
and therefore TV is a tautology. Then 7Bcv is a theorem by (Al). Since r k BCv, this 
contradicts the fact that r is consistent. Hence I 6 k < m. 
We next prove that 
r t B(Dt v.. . v D,) A B’(Q, v.. . ‘J Qk). (8) 
Since r t- B,u A Bcv, by the CNF axioms we have r k B( D1 V . . . V 0,) A Bc(Ql v 
. . . V Qm) . Notice that for all j E [k + 1, m] , Qj contains p and lp, for some p E P. 
Repeatedly invoking Lemma A.8, we obtain t Bc( Qi V. . . V Q,,,) % Bc( Ql V . . . V Qk) . 
Therefore, (8) is established. 
We now prove part (a). Assume, to the contrary, that there is 6i with YBSi E r such 
that for all situations such that s +=T p and s /&r TV we have s /=r &. 
Our goal is to derive a contradiction by proving r k B&. We do so by showing that 
for all C E SiCNF, r t- BC. Let C E SiCNF . If C is a tautology, it is trivial that r t- BC 
by axiom (A6). 
We now deal with the case where C is not a tautology. Without loss of generality, let 
D],... , D,, Q, , . . . , Qh (g 6 n, h 6 k) be the clauses that contain no literal of C (then 
D g+l,,.., Da, Qh+l, . . . , Qk contain at least one literal of C). We claim that for all Di 
(i E [l,g]) and Qj (j E [l,h]), there is some 2 E Di such that -I E Qj. Assume to 
the contrary that for some Di and Qj, there is no 1 E Di such that -1 E Qj. Consider 
the set of literals (-1 ( 1 E C} U Qj. This set does not contain both p and lp for any 
p E P, since C is not a tautology, Qj does not contain both p and yp for any p E P, 
and Qj contains no literal of C. Hence there is a situation s* such that for all p E P, 
i 
w ifpE{--Z]ZEC}UQjY 
S’(P) = {f} ifTpf{-Z(ZEC}UQj, 
07 f) otherwise. 
Then s* & 1 for all 1 E C, and s* &. -1 for all 1 E Qj. Hence, S* & C and 
s* pr -Qj. And s* +r Di, since Di contains no literal of C and there is no 1 E Di 
such that -I E Qj. It follows that s* pr 6i, s* &. lv and S* kr I_L. This contradicts 
our assumption that for all situations such that s b=T ,u and s kr. TV we have s kr. Si. 
So for all Di and Qj (i E [l,g],j E [l,h]), there exists some 1 E Di such that 
-1 E Qj. Consider D1. Let US denote by Zj the literal in DI such that -Zj E Qj. By 
Lemma A.4, 
B’(Q, V . . .vQk) tBc(-~,v..~v--lhvQh+lv...vQk), 
and, by Lemma A.2, 
B(Di v . . . v 0,) t- B( ( I1 A + . . A I/,) v D2 V . . . V 0,). 
For convenience, let p denote Qh+t V . . . V Qk. Notice that t- ZI A . . * A fh F -( -11 V 
. . . V -Zh). By Lemma A.7, 
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k B( (1, A.. . A Lh) V D2 V V D,) A Bc( -1, V V -I,, V /3) 
>B(D2V.,.vD,v/3). 
Hence, 
tB(D,V..~vD,)r\Bc(Ql v,.‘vQk) >B(D2v.~.vD,v/?). 
Applying the same procedure to D2, . , D,<, we have: 
EB(DzV~.~vD,vj3) r\Bc(Q, V.,,vQk) ~B(D~v.~~vD,,vfl) 
tB(D,-, v...vD,,VP) AB’(QI v.‘,vQk) ~B(D,v...vD,vp) 
i- B(D, v ‘. v D,, V /3) A B’(Q, V ‘. v Qk) > B(D,+, v . v D, v p), 







Note that either g < n or h < k holds. Otherwise, both g = n and h = k hold, and from 
(8)-( 1 l), we have r t BD, A B’(Q, V .. . V Qk). Similar to the case of D1 above, 
for every Qj (j E [ 1, h] ), there exists l,j E D, such that -1j E Q.i. Hence similarly we 
haveB’(Q,V..-VQk) tBc(-l,V.~.V-l/~) andBD,tB(l,A...Alh).Itfollowsthat 
r E B(1, A.. . A li,) A BC( -I, V . V -11,). But since we have the axiom Bca > ~B~LY 
(A5), this means that r is inconsistent, a contradiction. So there is at least one disjunct 
in D,+I V.. V D, V Qh+, V.. V Qk. 
Since each of D,+ I, . , D,,, Q,,+J , , Qk contains a literal of C, invoking Lemma A.5 
we have k B(D,+, V . V D,, V Q17+, V V Qk) 3 BC. It follows from ( 13) that 
f EBC. 
Thus, we have shown that f t BC, for all C E SioNF. By the axiom of conjunctive 
beliefs and (CNF) we have r k B6i. But this means r is inconsistent, a contradiction. 
This concludes the proof of part (a). 
For part (b), assume to the contrary that there is 4; with yBc4; E r such that for 
all s such that s I=, p and s /6r ~ZJ, we have s pfT -4,. Our goal is to derive a 
contradiction by proving r k BE&. 
Without loss of generality, assume Q, , . , Qh (h < k) be the Q in {Q,, . . , Qk} such 
that for every Di (i E [ 1, n] ) there exists some literal 1 E Di such that -1 E Q. To prove 
r i- Be&, it suffices to show that r E Bc(Qh+, V.. .VQk) and k B’(Qh+, V.. .VQk) 3 
BC+,. 
We first prove that r I- Bc( Qh+, V I V Qk). Consider Q, . Let us denote by li the 
literal in D; such that -1i E Ql. Applying Lemma A.2, we have 
i-B’(Q, V..,vQk) >BC((-1, A.../‘-l,,) vQ2v...vQk). 
By Lemma A.3, 
tB(D, v.‘.vD,) >B(l, v..‘vl,,). 
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Note that 1 11 V . . . V I,, E -(-II A.. . A -1,). By axiom (A9) we have 
k B(Z, v . . .vZ,) AB’((-It A...A-Z,) VQ2V...vQk) >BC(Q2v 
Hence, 
t-BB(DtV...VD,)ABc(Q, V...vQk) >Bc(Q2v...vQk). 
Applying the same procedure to Q2, . . ., Qh, we have 
t- B(D1 v.. .VD,)ABc(Q2V..~VQk) >Bc(Q3V...vQk) 
I- B(DI V . . . V 0,) A B’(Qh_1 v . . . v Qk) > Bc(Qh v . . . v Qk) 
t B(Dt v.. .VD,) AB’(QhV...VQk) > B’(Qh+, v...vQk). 
From (8) and (14)-( 17) it follows easily that 
rl-Bc(Q/,+i V+..vQk). 








Note that h # k. Otherwise, from (8) and (14)-( 16) we have r k B’Qh A B(Dt V 
. . . V D,). For every Di, there is some Zi E Di such that -Zi E Qh. Similar to the case 
of Qi above, we have that k B( Dt V . . . V 0,) 3 B(Zi V . . . V 1,) and l- B’Qh 3 
BC(-Zt A. ~~r\-Z,).Thus,~~B(Z1V~~~VZ,)~BC(-Z,~~~~~-Z,).Butsincewehave 
the axiom Bca > 7B-q this means that r is inconsistent, a contradiction. So there is 
at least one disjunct in Qh+t V . . . V Qk. 
It remains to show that 1 Be (Qh+t V . . . V Qk) 3 Be&. We do so by showing that for 
all C E 4iCNF, k BC( Qh+t V . . . V Qk) > B’C. Let C E 4iCNF. We now prove that for 
all j E [h + 1, k] , Qj contains at least one literal of C. Assume this is not the case for 
some Qj. Then because Qj does not contain both p and 7~ for any p E P, there exists 
a situation s* such that for all p E P, 
i 
{t) if p E Qj, 
s*(P) = 1-f) if -p E Qj, 
{tv .f) otherwise. 
The key feature of s* is that it supports every literal except the ones in {-Z 1 1 E Qj}. 
So it is clear that s* kr -Qj, and therefore s* Fr 1~. By the definition of Qj (where 
j E [h + 1, k]), we know that there is some Di (i E [l,n]) such that for all 1 E Diq 
-1 @ Qj. Hence S* br Di, and SO S* kT CL. 
But s* kr -Z, for all 1 E C, since no literal of C is contained in Qj. Hence 
s* +r -C, from which it follows that s* kr 74i. This contradicts our assumption that 
for all situations s such that s +r ,u and s pr TV, we have s pr l4i. 
Hence for all j E [ h + 1, k] , Qj contains at least one literal of C. By Lemma A.5, 
then t- BC(Qh+i V . e . V Qk) > B’C. This holds for all C E 4iar. By the axiom of 
conjunctive beliefs and (CNF) we have t- Bc( Qh+t V.. .V Qk) 3 Be&. Then from ( 18) 
it follows that r k BC4i. But this means r is inconsistent, a contradiction. 
94 .I. Lin/Artijiciul Infelligence 86 (1996) 75-95 
This concludes the proof of part (b). q 
We now proceed to prove the main theorem. We construct a set of situations S as 
follows: starting from an empty S, for every 6; such that lBSi E r, add to S a situation 
promised by the above Lemma A.lO(a), i.e., a situation s such that s +r A yi, s pr 
-( /j\pi) and s Fr 6i; and for every 4; such that 7BCqbj E I-, add to S a situation 
promised by the above Lemma A. lO( b), i.e., a situation s such that s /=r A yi, s & 
-(/j\pi) and s kr +i. 
Suppose S = {si , . . , s,}. Let (pi, , p,,} be a set of atoms that are not mentioned in 
r. For i E [ 1, n], let si be the situation whose set-ups are identical to that of si, except 
for its effect on the atoms in {pi,. ,p,,}. For these atoms, we define s:(pi) = {t, f} 
ands~(qj)={t}foralljfiandjE[l,n]. 
Let M = {si,..., $,}. Then from the set-ups for the atoms in {pi,. ,p,}, it is 
easy to see there is no situation in M that is more complete than any other situation 
in the set. Hence MC(M) = M. Then every situation in M supports A yi, since the 
corresponding situation in S does so. Hence M /=r Byi for every yi. And no situation in 
M supports 7 ( A pi>, as the situations in S do not. Then by Lemma 3, every situation 
in M supports A pi. It follows that M /=r BCp, for every pI. For every 6i, there is a 
situation in M that does not support it, as there is a situation in S that does not support 
6,. Hence M +r lB6i. For every q5;, there is a situation in M that supports 74i, as 
there is a situation in S that does so. Hence M /==, TBc4i. It follows that M br r. r 
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